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Abstract
The Beijing Consensus is said to be a win-win for China and Africa. China has 
become a major force in global telecommunications markets, as a manufacturer, a 
content provider and in delivering services to its citizens. While the relationship 
between China and Africa has been explored in many areas, telecommunications 
has been ignored, despite its strong domestic performance, as well as the presence of 
Chinese equipment in African networks and in the hands of consumers. China has 
not exported its domestic model of competing state-owned operators, nor have those 
operators followed the “going out” strategy. However, manufacturers have benefitted 
from the Washington Consensus model of oligopolistic markets. In countries with 
higher risks, they have been aided by Chinese development banks and intergovern-
mental agreements. In a new policy model, for the Comoros and Ethiopia, Chinese 
firms have taken on outsourcing of network functions for the state-owned operators. 
Additionally, manufacturers have found several channels to supply feature-phones 
and smartphones at low prices, helping to widen access. Absent from African mar-
kets are the providers of Internet content and apps. There is very little evidence of 
spillover effects, with little knowledge being transferred. China has won from hard-
ware sales in Africa, while Africans have won wider access to telecommunications, 
including states rejecting the Washington Consensus model.
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1. Introduction
The support of Mao Zedong and the Communist Party of China (CPC) for anti-co-
lonial movements in Africa was, after a long gap, replaced by the Beijing Consensus, 
a model of development said to offer mutual benefits, in contrast to the Washington 
Consensus, preferred and promoted by the international financial institutions (IFIs), 
with its allegedly exploitative neoliberal ideology (Kennedy, 2010; McKinnon, 2010; 
Williamson, 2012).1 China has become the largest trade partner and the largest de-
veloping country investor in Africa, in addition to providing financial and technical 
assistance (Busse, Erdogan & Mühlen, 2016). The recent shift in the Chinese econ-
omy has seen a steep fall in demand for physical resources, as it moves to higher val-
ue-added activities. The responses to the economic and policy changes in China have 
lacked clear and coherent strategies from African governments, suggesting they are 
not taking full advantage of the potential opportunities. The business and economic 
engagements between China and Africa have been and continue to be examined in 
detail; the extraction of gas, oil and ores to supply Chinese manufacturers, the farms 
that feed its population (Bräutigam, 2015), and the import of Chinese manufac-
tures into Africa (Alden, Large, & Soares de Oliveira, 2008; Manji & Marks, 2007; 
Wang & Elliot, 2014). This article addresses an area previously ignored, that of the 
telecommunications sector, in which China has become a significant presence, in 
policies, in the provision of infrastructure, in the sale of manufactures and, thus, in 
the everyday lives of Africans.
Global best practice in telecommunications policy, as advocated and supported by the 
IFIs, aims for limited, oligopolistic competition by a complex mix of financialisation, 
liberalisation, privatisation, and regulation (Blackman & Srivastava, 2011; Intven, 
Oliver & Sepulveda, 2000). Network operators must obtain government licences, ei-
ther alone or with international or local partners. Manufacturers then sell equipment 
to the licensed operators and to their customers, with volumes dependent on growth 
of the market and thus on politico-regulatory decision-making, notably on levels of 
competition. Consequently, there is intensive corporate political activity (CPA) by 
manufacturers and operators in the elaboration and adaptation of policies at global, 
continental, regional, national, provincial and municipal levels (Sutherland, 2014).
Telecommunications has been recognised as an infrastructure enabling and gener-
ating economic development and growth (Röller & Waverman, 2001; Waverman, 
Meschi & Fuss, 2005). Networks widen markets, improve information flows, lower 
transaction costs and substitute for physical transport. They also provide a platform 
for economic or Schumpeterian disruption, notably through the “Überisation” of es-
tablished markets (Nurvala, 2015). 
The development of telecommunications in Africa is invariably presented as a pos-
1  This non-interference model is being supplemented by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB, 2016).
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itive story (Etzo & Collender, 2010), though it is largely alien, with governments 
adopting policies developed by the countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), usually without much formal adaptation or 
customisation to national circumstances. The resulting markets are dominated by 
Arab, European and Indian operator groups, supplied with equipment from manu-
facturers in China, Europe and North America. Commercial practices have proved 
so successful, that they have spilled over from competitive and well-governed mar-
kets, into countries that do not or could not follow the best practice model, including 
(i) micro-states and small island developing states (SIDS), with weak institutions 
and without economies of scale; (ii) conflict and post-conflict states, where good 
governance was unavoidably absent; and (iii) countries without liberalisation or com-
petition. 
China is a major source for Africa, both of network equipment for operators and of 
phones and smartphones for consumers, with their low unit costs greatly improving 
affordability. Its network equipment manufacturers have, where there are heightened 
political risks, been supported by intergovernmental agreements and by loans from 
development banks. Manufacturers of handsets have engaged on purely commercial 
terms, proving flexible in their use of formal and informal distribution channels. 
However, Chinese operators are entirely absent, a difference that cannot be coinci-
dental. Nonetheless, some networks have been constructed and a few subsequently 
run by other Chinese firms. Countries that would not implement the global best 
practice reforms have benefitted from the greater flexibility of the Beijing Consensus, 
and are thus meeting demand for services and boosting their economic growth.
Africa cannot be treated as a single entity, rather it should be disaggregated, to con-
sider countries that are small and large, coastal and landlocked, peaceful and in con-
flict, democratic and autocratic, rich and poor in resources (Mohan, 2013b). Simi-
larly, China should be divided into the CPC, federal and provincial governments, 
state-owned and private enterprises, and individual migrant traders (Gonzalez-Vi-
cente, 2011), with private enterprises much less engaged with the “going out” strat-
egy of the government than state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Gu, Chuanhong, Vaz 
& Mukwereza, 2016). 
Mohan has described the fragmentation amongst academics, amongst the experts on 
internal processes in China, amongst others who have examined Chinese economic 
activities in individual African nations, as well as the strongly ideological accounts 
of China’s external relations and largely non-African accounts of Africa (Mohan, 
2013a). The challenge he posed was to paint a more complete picture of China-Af-
rica engagements, drawing on a variety of perspectives, disciplines, case studies and 
data. This article aims to provide one such case study, for the telecommunications 
sector (Sutherland, 2016). It next examines the general economic engagement of 
China in Africa, followed by short analyses of telecommunications in China and 
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then in Africa. This is followed by a review of the various areas of Chinese activity 
in African telecommunications markets. Finally, conclusions are drawn and issues 
identified for further research.
2. China in Africa
The commercial and political presence of China in Africa, has been extensively an-
alysed, with growing interest in military activity (e.g., its naval base at Djibouti). 
The USA has been a severe critic of the allegedly unscrupulous behaviour of the 
Chinese (Bräutigam, 2011; Power, Mohan & Tan-Mullins, 2012). Concerns about 
its government and multi-national enterprises (MNEs) may reflect differences from, 
rather than being better or worse than, the behaviour of the former colonial powers, 
reflecting centuries of viewing Africa as a target for colonialisation. 
Firms from the European Union and North America are expected to support de-
mocracy, environmental protection, human rights, good governance and transparen-
cy, through public and, increasingly mandatory, commitments to the OECD Guide-
lines for MNEs (OECD, 2011). Those from China are considered uninterested, as are 
MNEs from the Persian Gulf. Yet MNEs based in OECD countries have pandered 
to kleptocrats, paid bribes, supported nepotism, sold wire-tapping equipment, and 
disregarded environmental damage. Nonetheless, by engaging with any and every 
government, China and Chinese MNEs are accused of setting back the, admittedly 
limited, progress made in governance and human rights (Gu, Humphrey & Messner, 
2008; Noman, Botchwey, Stein & Stiglitz, 2012).
Sustained economic growth in China increased demand for gas, oil and metallic ores 
far beyond its domestic resources, leading to a pursuit of licences and mining rights 
across Africa, raising volumes traded and unit prices paid (Zafar, 2007). Chinese 
firms, often SOEs, outbid manufacturers from OECD countries on infrastructure 
projects, and elsewhere were supported by loans from Chinese development banks, 
and aided by inter-governmental negotiations, allegedly increasing Chinese bargain-
ing power when acquiring natural resources (Vines, 2007). The Chinese government 
issued innovative loans secured against natural resources (e.g., oil from Angola and 
copper from Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC]), and sometimes paid in 
infrastructure, the value of which is not easily assessed. These “Angola mode” deals 
were an alternative to IFI loans with their structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) 
(Habiyaremye, 2016). The provision of infrastructure allowed China to use its de-
velopment expertise, deploying teams of architects, engineers and, even, construction 
workers to build hospitals, railways, roads, and schools, some of the infrastructure 
later being used to transport oil and ores to Chinese ships. Mineral extraction was 
supposedly performed in enclaves, with strongly Chinese characteristics: their own 
workers, rice and, even, cooking oil (Michel & Beuret, 2009). The most outrageous 
allegation was that gangs of convicts had been transported to Africa to reduce labour 
costs (Hairong & Sautman, 2012).
The African Journal of Information and Communication (AJIC), Issue 17, 2016 169
 China and Africa: Alternative Telecommunication Policies and Practices
Economic reforms brought a sustained boom in manufacturing in China, attracting 
significant elements of global production facilities, to take advantage of the lower la-
bour costs and access to its domestic market. At the same time, the SAPs, advocated 
by the IFIs and adopted by governments, opened African markets to imports (Rid-
dell, 1992). The resulting flow of cheap Chinese manufactures undermined already 
limited African production, diminished exports and created trade deficits, except for 
those countries with mineral and petroleum exports. Thus, Franks and Ribet (2009) 
argue that:
Although African consumers certainly benefit from goods many could pre-
viously not afford (especially electrical items), cheap Chinese goods have 
also contributed to the decline of industrial production and the growing 
retrenchment of workers. (Franks & Ribet, 2009, pp. 133-134)
To make matters worse, displaced workers typically moved into low productivity 
activities, such as agriculture and informal employment (McMillan, Rodrik & Ver-
duzco-Gallo, 2014). 
Special economic zones (SEZs) were established in Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mau-
ritius, Nigeria and Zambia to allow Chinese manufacturers access to markets less 
competitive than China and to transfer activities that could be replaced by more 
sophisticated manufacturing at home (Bräutigam & Tang, 2014). Information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) were limited, with Mauritius having some ICT 
services and the Lusaka SEZ said to have had electronic assembly. However, the 
SEZs were plagued with delays and generated very limited spill over of knowledge, 
failing to benefit local economies (Hanusch, 2012; World Bank, 2011).
In the cities of Guangzhou, formerly Canton, and Shenzhen are found large num-
bers of African traders, many as visitors, though some are now residents, seeking 
to purchase goods for resale in Africa (Bodomo, 2010; Lyons, Brown & Li, 2013). 
Textiles, clothing, household fixtures, electrical and electronic goods (notably mobile 
phones and tablet computers), are shipped to Africa by air and by sea, some pass-
ing through third countries to avoid customs duties and import restrictions in their 
intended markets. Some individual Chinese have taken the opportunity to move to 
Africa, becoming retailers and displacing local traders.
The evolving economic relationship between China and Africa remains contentious 
and contested, seen as both exploitative and mutually beneficial, presently being test-
ed by the realignment of the Chinese economy.
3. Telecommunications in China
Set apart from global best practice in telecommunications policy, the sector in Chi-
na has, nonetheless, seen dramatic transformations. The reforms launched by Deng 
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Xiaoping saw the extension of the fixed telephone network, soon outpaced by mo-
bile telephony, initially in cities and later the countryside, achieving near universal 
availability (Harwit, 2004; 2007; Xia, 2016a; 2016b). This was enabled and driven by 
the growth of manufacturing in China, of both handsets for customers and network 
equipment for operators, the result of foreign direct investment (FDI), first in man-
ufacturing and then in research and development (R&D). Network competition was 
limited to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), in contrast to Russia, where privatisation 
came first, handing control to oligarchs, from whom it has never been recovered 
(Stiglitz, 1999). Internet access is behind the “Great Firewall of China”,2 allowing 
domestic providers of apps, content and services to grow very large, protected from 
foreign competition by SOEs or state-linked corporations, under the guidance of 
the CPC/state, seeking to (i) develop economic capability; (ii) shift from importing 
foreign to exporting indigenous technologies; and (iii) develop a service sector, in-
cluding content and application providers.
China is an increasingly powerful player in global production networks (GPNs), in 
which the activities of MNEs are spread across many countries (Coe, Dicken, & 
Hess, 2008). In telecommunications it is involved in all stages of the value chain, in-
cluding research and development; standard setting; design; manufacture; construc-
tion and management of networks for operators; and provision in China of a full 
range of telecommunications and Internet services, and applications.
China joined the World Trade Organisation in 2001 (WTO, 2015), and commit-
ted to liberalise its telecommunications markets (DeWoskin, 2001; Zhang, 2001), 
despite which, SOEs remain overwhelmingly dominant. The expectation had been 
that liberalisation would open the way for FDI, with foreign operators providing the 
expertise and finance essential to expand and upgrade networks (Fu & Mou, 2010). 
Instead, the government created three SOEs from the state provider, instructed them 
to compete, one with another, while their expansion was funded from their own rev-
enues and by minority flotations on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) (see 
Figure 1) (Loo, 2004). The choice of the British Virgin Islands (BVI), an opaque, 
offshore corporate registry, for two holding companies has never been officially ex-
plained. While Shen (2012) suggests the structure is because of “tax, legal and reg-
ulatory concerns”, this makes little sense, since these could easily be modified by the 
government. BVI can be for tax avoidance and the concealment of transactions, part 
of an increasing circulation of money between China and the Caribbean. Its use for 
allegedly corrupt dealings by the Chinese elite has been highlighted by the Interna-
tional Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ, 2014).
2  Officially known as the Golden Shield.
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Figure 1: Ownership of the three Chinese operators3
The superficially strange model of competition amongst SOEs is surprisingly ef-
fective (Mora & Wiktorowicz, 2003; Xia, 2012). It is subject to opaque political 
direction by the State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC), which acts more as a regulator, ensuring political control, reinforced by a 
CPC committee inside each firm (Yeo, 2009).4 This is considered essential to deliver 
economic growth, which helps to legitimise the government (Yeo, 2013). Liberalisa-
tion was begun with eleven Chinese firms selected to become mobile virtual network 
operators (MVNOs) (Barton, 2014), though they have made little progress in the 
face of competition from the three dominant and entrenched SOEs (Zallman, 2016).
The selection of 3G technologies was on governmental, not commercial, criteria. 
Each operator was required to adopt a different 3G network technology (see Table 
1), providing test-beds and showcases to support exports by Chinese manufacturers:
Although adopting multiple standards may not be consumer friendly, may create 
issues of interoperability and may be less cost effective by increasing the cost for 
managing the infrastructure, it nevertheless has provided a resolution to sensitive 
issues concerning China’s WTO commitments, and satisﬁes the TD constituency. 
(Stewart, Shen, Wang & Graham, 2011, p. 781)5 
3  The only significant foreign investment is a crossholding between Telefónica de España and China 
Unicom.
4  For example, Wang Xiaochu, Chairman of China Telecom and Chairman of the Party Committee 
at China Telecom, has also been an alternate member of Central Party Committee from 2007.
5  More fully TD-SCDMA or Time Division Synchronous Code Division Multiple Access, it is 
the Chinese version of 3G, a technology that might well have been rejected had the operators made 
purely commercial decisions.
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This was repeated with 4G, when the government initially licensed the Chinese 
version (TD-LTE) and only later the global version (FDD-LTE) that two of the op-
erators had sought, despite 4G being a priority in its 2013 broadband strategy. China 
Mobile quickly deployed an extensive TD-LTE network, partly because its Chinese 
technology 3G network had been commercially disadvantageous. 
Table 1: Mobile technologies used by Chinese network operators
Generation China Mobile China Unicom China Telecom
3G TD-SCDMA UMTS CDMA2000
4G TD-LTE TD-LTE & FDD-LTE TD-LTE & FDD-LTE
The overall result is impressive, in both geographic and demographic reach (see Fig-
ure 2), and progression through technological generations, with over 500 million 
4G users at the end of 2016 Q1 (Qiang, Bhavnani, Hanna, Kimura, & Sudan, 2009; 
Xinhua, 2013; CNNIC, 2016).
Figure 2: Internet users in China
Source: CNNIC (2016)
Unlike the manufacturers, the operators did not follow the “going out” imperative 
from government, declining the many opportunities for foreign expansion, not least 
in Africa. The exception is China Mobile, which has two modest investments in 
China Mobile Pakistan (t/a Zong);6 and True Group of Thailand.7 The preference 
of the CPC/state was that they invest in domestic operations, especially in upgrad-
ing to new technologies. Huawei and Zhongxing Telecommunication Equipment 
6  In 2007, it acquired 100% from Millicom.
7  In 2014, it acquired 18% for USD880 million.
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Corporation (ZTE), the two leading manufacturers, have both “gone out” on a large 
scale, becoming significant players in the global market (see Figure 3), seen as ex-
emplars of emerging economy multinational enterprises (EE-MNEs) (Sun, 2009). 
Their overseas expansion has been backed by the government and supported by the 
China Exim Bank, China CITIC Bank and China Development Bank. 
Figure 3: Revenues of Huawei and ZTE
Source: Huawei Annual Reports (2006-2015), ZTE Annual Reports (2006-2015)
The Directorate General of Telecommunications (DGT) had a unit for the project 
management, design and construction of networks. This had originally been spun off 
in 1999 as part of China Telecom, from which China Netcom, the northern part, was 
later spun off. In 2006, China Telecom, which held the southern part, spun off China 
Communications Services Corporation Limited (CCS), listing it on the HKSE (see 
Figure 4). Then in 2011, CCS acquired the northern part, which had been sepa-
rated from China Netcom as China International Telecommunications Construc-
tion Company, for CNY505 million (CITCC, 2013).8 CCS has been the principal 
builder of mobile networks in China, with CITCC supporting the manufacturers by 
building networks overseas.
8  China Netcom was later acquired by China Unicom.
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Figure 4: China Communications Services Corporation Ltd
Source: CCS (n.d.)
The market for handsets is more complex and more competitive, with the govern-
ment having initially licensed selected manufacturers, while others operated as shan 
zhai or mountain fortress bandits, producing cheaper and more disruptive devices 
(Zhou, Tong & Li, 2011; Lee & Hung, 2014; Chubb, 2015; Dong & Flowers, 2016). 
These firms evaded controls, initially in “mosquito” factories, assembling phones that 
were stylish, gimmicky, or imitated the latest models of the major domestic and for-
eign manufacturers, but at much lower prices, based on chip sets that had the core 
functions of a phone, developed by MediaTek (MTK) and Spreadtrum (Tse, Ma & 
Huang, 2010).9 They opened new markets, for poorer citizens, especially those in 
smaller cities and the countryside, but were also taken by those “going out” to devel-
oping countries. The lifting of the licensing requirement in October 2007 legitimised 
the shan zhai manufacturers, which had proved nimbler than the licensed firms. The 
most remarkable story has been the rise of Xiaomi, founded in 2009 and a global 
player within five years, but seems to already be failing to make the transition to more 
expensive devices, unlike Oppo and Vivo (Shih, Lin & Luarn, 2014; IDC, 2016).
The Great Firewall blocks access to foreign Internet services (Ensafi, Winter, Mueen& 
Crandall, 2015; Li & Reimers, 2015; Minzner, 2015; Stevenson, 2007; Yuen, 2015), 
behind which there grew up providers of a range of applications and content, some 
of which are now amongst the largest Internet companies (e.g., Alibaba, Tencent and
Weibo).10 The suppliers grew rapidly by replicating business models devised in de-
veloped economies (e.g., search and social networking), in effect import-substitution 
9  Among the features added were ultraviolet lights to test the authenticity of banknotes and du-
al-SIM card slots to avoid the limitations of a single network.
10  e.g., Tencent’s first product was a copy of ICQ, a US-based instant messaging service, otherwise 
banned in China.
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industrialisation (ISI). One domestic requirement has been for very tight controls, 
sometimes styled “censorship 2.0”, involving both automatic and human interven-
tions (King, Pan & Roberts, 2014). Thus while Baidu, the dominant Chinese search 
engine, embraced censorship and collaboration with government, Google retreated 
to Hong Kong, SAR, to avoid compliance and in order to protect its global brand 
(Lu, Hu, Liang, Lin & Peng, 2013), while Facebook has been developing censorship 
capabilities to enter the market (Frier, 2016).
The Chinese government has run a campaign against corruption, including prose-
cuting some formerly very senior figures (Chow, 2015). Chang Xiaobing, resigned as 
Chairman of China Telecom, because of investigations into his former role at China 
Unicom (BBC, 2015). Li Hua, former chairman of the Sichuan branch of China 
Mobile, was convicted of accepting more than USD2.5 million in bribes (Barboza, 
2011). Zhang Chunjiang, who had held posts in a provincial administration, China 
Netcom and China Mobile, was sentenced to death following his conviction for 
bribery, with his personal assets confiscated and political rights stripped (SCMP, 
2011). He had taken CNY7.46 million in bribes from a telecommunications compa-
ny and an advertising company. Additionally, there have been a few overseas prosecu-
tions for bribery, for example, ZTE managers were convicted in Algeria and Lucent 
was found by US authorities to have bribed officials from an unspecified Chinese 
operator.11 
Today, China is a leading global supplier of network equipment and handsets, and an 
exemplar of the widespread adoption of telecommunications and the Internet, albeit 
strictly censored. However, its model is not replicable, because of the enormous do-
mestic economies of scale, the decades of planning, and the carefully acquired skills 
in manufacturing, design, research and standardisation. Nor is it easily understood, 
because of the opaque processes of competition amongst SOEs, corporate political 
activity (Gao, 2008), compliance with censorship and the movement of officials be-
tween party, government and operators.
4. Telecommunications in Africa
In the years following their independence, African countries neither changed direct 
state provision nor encouraged expansion of their fixed networks, with post-colonial 
governments maintaining moribund institutions and policies (Noam, 1999). Starting 
only about 15 years ago, there came the unexpected rise of mobile services, with the 
acceptance of major policy changes: introducing competition, private capital and-
cellular wireless technologies. The crucial retail innovation was the prepaid offer, 
turning niche markets for elites of a few thousand into mass markets for millions.12 
This is now being extended from voice and text messages to mobile Internet access, 
11  SEC v. Lucent Technologies Inc., Civ. Act. No. 1:07-cv-02301 (D.D.C.) (RBW) (filed December 21, 
2007) and in re Lucent Technologies Inc. (November 14, 2007).
12  While the unit prices might have been high, spending was easily controlled.
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supplemented by limited offers of fixed broadband. There was also a surge of invest-
ment in undersea cables, both purely commercial and with governmental involve-
ment (Song, 2015).
Analyses of telecommunications have generally been framed in terms of “divides” 
compared to the OECD countries. Each discipline created its own interpretation of 
this divide, whether the availability of networks or their use, through to the reaping 
of the social and economic benefits, and political participation (Fuchs & Horak, 
2008; James, 2016, pp. 89-93; Pick & Sarkar, 2015, pp. 275-310). Complex spatial 
patterns were identified, with variations between countries, and between cities and 
the countryside (Chéneau-Loquay, 2007). One divide that affects future econom-
ic growth is the use of ICTs in higher education (Pehrson, 2010; Rye, 2008). It is 
sometimes inverted into a, perhaps overly optimistic, “digital opportunity”, raising 
difficult questions as to who might grasp this and the conditions they would require 
to succeed. The poorer performing countries and operators have been ignored or 
glossed over, playing down the challenges of overcoming weak governance, providing 
high quality services, any service at all in remote areas, or affordable services for the 
urban poor.
The growth of the revenues of mobile operators has been slowing, reflecting declin-
ing expansion in subscriber numbers, increasing competitive pressures and regulatory 
actions (GSMA, 2015). In Sub-Saharan Africa the recent compound annual growth 
rate (CAGR) has been 7%, with the broadly defined mobile ecosystem generating 
5.7% of GDP, forecast to rise to 8.2%, due to increased use of mobile broadband. 
In 2014, capital investment was USD9 billion and the sector employed 4.4 million, 
with operators collecting USD15 billion in taxes for governments, in addition to the 
payment of licence and regulatory fees, plus one-off spectrum auction fees.
Gillwald (2013) asserted that “mobile is closing the voice and the data gap in Africa”, 
in effect that it was catching up with the OECD countries. Yet Informa (2010) used 
a factor of 1.24 to reduce reported mobile subscriptions in Africa to real and distinct 
individuals, further lowered by the mobile operators using a factor of 2.0 (GSMA, 
2012). The number of active SIM-cards held by an individual varies between and 
within countries, allowing them to switch networks to make cheaper on-net calls, 
because of distortions in tariffs and wholesale rates; overcome poor coverage by op-
erators; and avoid congestion, because there are too many customers on a network 
(Sutherland, 2009). These market problems have been ignored or inadequately ad-
dressed by governments and regulatory authorities. 
Although the policy and regulatory approaches were largely derived from the Euro-
pean Union (Stork & Gillwald, 2014), governments failed to collect the data and to 
use the competition analyses, impact assessments and public consultations that the 
EU considers essential, whereas, regulatory authorities have engaged in an almost 
The African Journal of Information and Communication (AJIC), Issue 17, 2016 177
 China and Africa: Alternative Telecommunication Policies and Practices
obsessive registration of SIM-cards. This is despite obvious limitations of inadequate 
information systems, weak cyber security, unreliable national identity documents and 
transcription errors, leading to inaccurate databases, without evidence of their use in 
criminal prosecutions (Donovan & Martin, 2014).
Figure 5 shows the range of prices, far greater than any underlying cost differences, 
with many countries lacking sufficient competition to drive prices down or regula-
tions that might substitute for or complement that competition. Consequently, for 
many people mobile services remain unaffordable, while for others they are only 
intermittently within reach (Duncan, 2013; Powell, 2014). Unfortunately, regulatory 
authorities do not measure affordability, leaving that to researchers.
Figure 5: Cheapest prepaid offers for OECD “40 call basket”
Source: RIA (2013)
The second claim by Gillwald (2013), about the closing data gap or “digital divide”, 
is more difficult to assess. The majority of Africans still have no access to the Internet 
and those that do are constrained from using bandwidth-intensive services, such as 
Netflix, Skype and YouTube, as the result of usage-sensitive tariff structures.13 There 
are currently bitter arguments about the merits of zero-rated tariffs and “free” Wi-Fi. 
Any services paid for by advertising or customer data present severe problems, given 
the weakness of consumer protection and privacy laws and of enforcement agencies. 
There has been only limited, but growing, deployment of fibre to the home (FTTH), 
with most consumers relying on mobile services, raising questions about availability, 
13  e.g., download caps and per-megabyte charges.
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affordability and network quality, and of the lack of agreed metrics to measure prog-
ress, in particular in determining the depth and richness of the experience of the use 
of mobile services.
Given the need for substantial further investment in infrastructure, the ability of 
operators to maintain and upgrade networks, which is essential to carry growing data 
traffic, revenues are a central concern (Williams, 2008). If retail prices are too high, 
then use will be discouraged and revenues will be insufficient, similarly, if too low, 
they will require unaffordable investments in infrastructure. A global pattern of cus-
tomers switching from paying services to apps offering free voice and SMS threatens 
operator revenues, diminishing their incentives to invest in networks ( Jayakar & 
Park, 2014; Peng, 2016; Xu & Chen, 2016).
While ministers talk about competition and are supported by operators, mobile 
markets are oligopolies with little prospect of further market entry, and significant 
risks of consolidation.14 Competition is constrained by first-mover advantages and by 
global allocations of spectrum, which permit only a very few operators, and the sub-
sequent national assignments of spectrum to operators, which has been conducted 
with little transparency, with lobbyists fighting over each successive licence and spec-
trum band. Ownership is dominated by a handful of major multi-national groups 
(Curwen & Whalley, 2011; Sutherland, 2007): Bharti Airtel (India); Etisalat (UAE); 
MTN (South Africa); Orange (France); and Vodafone Group (UK).
Not all African countries have been willing to adopt the best practice policies pressed 
on them by the IFIs, with a few preferring to retain a monopoly state provider, while 
others lacked the ability or did not have the “good governance” necessary for imple-
mentation and thus investment. Some were too small to achieve economies of scale 
for multiple operators. Nonetheless, Figure 6 shows the use of mobile telephones 
in the poorest performing African states, where there is solid growth, with the sole 
exception of Eritrea, where the government seems intent on depriving its citizens of 
access to telecommunications. In part, these successes are due to the diffusion of suc-
cessful business models and commercial practices, with smaller and weaker operators 
copying nearby countries, aided by manufacturers and software houses offering the 
necessary technical support and vendor finance. 
14  As seen with the disappearance of Yu Mobile (Essar) in Kenya.
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Figure 6: Mobile teledensities in poorer performing countries in Africa
Source: UN (2015)
Civil conflicts and their aftermath present challenges to good governance, supposed-
ly a requirement for well-ordered markets, so that investors ought to have been hes-
itant, an obstacle which seems to have been overcome. Micro-states lack economies 
of scale in both markets and institutions, the former undermining profitability and 
the latter limiting the ability to implement the policies and regulations, yet these too 
have growing mobile markets. 
Mobile banking has been an area of mixed successes, with mobile operators bringing 
banking and financial services to some of the “unbanked” and obtaining a slice of the 
very substantial remittance business, but with some governments having been reti-
cent (Buku & Meredith, 2013; Dunn, 2015; Hughes & Lonie, 2007; Jun & Palacios, 
2016; Suárez, 2016). Initiated in Somalia, it was quickly overtaken by M-Pesa in 
Kenya, a service from the state-owned Safaricom working as a “fast follower”. How-
ever, in countries where the banks are well established, there has been resistance from 
banking regulators, supported by banking lobbyists.
Through mobile networks and prepaid services, using a model of limited competition 
amongst commercial operators, Africa has shown substantial growth. This has spread 
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into almost all countries with variations of the global best practice model, even where 
the prerequisite of good governance appears to be absent, as operators copy business 
models and commercial practices. Capital and technology are overwhelmingly for-
eign,15 though with some development of apps for smartphones and tablet computers 
in innovation centres with venture capital in Kenya and South Africa (Kelly, 2014).
5. Chinese telecommunications in Africa
At the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), Chinese then-President 
Jiang Zemin noted that (Zemin, 2000): "The gap between the North and the South 
is being widened not only economically, but also in science and technology. Hence, 
there has emerged a disturbing 'digital divide'." Chinese efforts to address this have 
included loans by development banks; sale of network equipment, handsets, smart-
phones and tablet computers; network construction and management; and exchange 
of voice telephony and international mobile roaming traffic. There is little, if any, 
presence of network operators, and only limited presence of service providers, such 
as Tencent and Weibo, with some virtual private network (VPN) services provided 
by PCCW.
In OECD countries, mobile operators are a principal distribution channel for hand-
sets for the larger manufacturers, which bundle them with services, together with 
large chains of electronics or specialist stores. In Africa, where the majority of cus-
tomers are pre-paid, they mostly buy cheaper, entry-level or second-hand devices, 
with operators offering own-brand Chinese handsets at low prices.16 Electronic 
equipment, including phones, is available through semi-formal channels, along with 
the other manufactures brought from China by traders. Governments have become 
concerned by no-brand and “counterfeit” handsets, which challenge the profit mar-
gins of the major brands and tax revenues, but increase consumer welfare through the 
cheaper adoption of mobile telecommunications (ITU, 2010; ITU-T, 2012; ITU-D, 
2014). 
The design and manufacture of network equipment is capital intensive, with formal 
purchasing procedures, in which well-financed operator groups buy and install com-
petitively priced equipment, frequently from Huawei and ZTE (see Figure 7). The 
manufacturers also tender for and often win supply contracts funded by the IFIs. 
15  An exception is Nigeria, where domestic entrepreneurs operate two networks. 
16  For example, MTN South Africa offered a “Steppa” 3.5-inch Android smartphone with a Snap-
dragon processor for ZAR499, with three months free social networking (ITWeb, 2014).
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Figure 7: ZTE revenues in Africa
Source: ZTE Annual Reports (2008-2015)
Where an operator lacks the necessary organisational capacity, the equipment can be 
installed by CITCC and, if necessary, operated by it:
Having carried out the “going global” strategy of the CPC Central Com-
mittee, CITCC has witnessed a stair-like expansion of business from eco-
nomic assistance projects, subcontracting projects to contracting projects 
in overseas communication engineering construction market. Its general 
contracting construction projects such as national backbone cable networks 
in Ethiopia and Nigeria have been well received by the governments and 
owners. Acting as the first general contractor of overseas large commu-
nication projects among Chinese communication construction enterprise, 
CITCC has built up a good professional enterprise image in international 
market. (CITCC, 2014)
The ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) rejected 
liberalisation and privatisation, insisting on a state controlled monopoly, resulting 
in a break with the IFIs and forcing Ethiopia Telecoms Company (ETC) to look 
elsewhere for finance (Workneh, 2014; 2016). ETC signed major contracts with 
Huawei, ZTE and CITCC, worth USD2.4 billion in 2006, for a 2G network, later 
extended to 3G and 4G, and expanded coverage (Cheru, 2016). This was supported 
by Chinese development banks, without any investment by the Ethiopian govern-
ment, all the costs being recovered from customers, with the government also ex-
tracting significant profits (Davidson, 2012). ETC was rebranded as Ethio-Telecom 
and placed under the management of Orange from 2010 to 2012, but this con-
tract was not renewed. The result has been the façade of an Ethiopian SOE, behind 
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which were three Chinese SOEs doing much of the work. Despite comparatively 
low teledensity (see Figure 6), the government justifies the maintenance of state 
ownership by extracting an estimated USD3.5 billion generated, to pay for other 
infrastructure. Between 2010 and 2012, reports emerged that indicate the Ethiopian 
state’s utilisation of technologies both to exercise targeted electronic blackouts and to 
carry out widespread online surveillance [anti-terrorism laws]. The facility to mon-
itor and track dissidents has proved controversial, with the government acquiring 
software from European firms to supplement the facilities offered by Huawei and 
ZTE (HRW, 2014).
The Union of the Comoros rejected repeated calls from the IFIs for the privatisation 
of Comores Telecom (Comtel), formerly the Société Nationale des Postes et Télécom-
munications (SNPT). Instead, Comtel upgraded its mobile network and inter-island 
links with support from China. The IFIs continued to press for privatisation, as part 
of its Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) programme, which was rejected by 
the Comoran Parliament, though with the concession of a possible second mobile 
licence from the Autorité Nationale de Régulation des TIC (ANRTIC).17 From a 
short list of Mauritius Telecom and Telecom Malagasy (Telma) of Madagascar, it 
chose the latter, then, bizarrely, sought regulatory support from Madagascar (Telege-
ography, 2015; 2016).
Given the development of Chinese mobile standards and the strong presence of 
Chinese manufacturers, these networks might have been expected to be deployed in 
Africa. Yet, most of the 4G networks are using global FDD technology, with TD-
LTE having been taken up mostly by fixed wireless ISPs, seeking to replace their 
WiMAX networks that had proved a commercial and technological dead-end (see 
Table 2). Some mobile operators offer both FDD and TD-LTE.
Table 2: TD-LTE networks in Africa 
Country Operator Launch
South Africa Telkom April 2013
Uganda MTN April 2013
Nigeria Spectranet August 2013
Nigeria Swift Networks November 2013
Ghana NITA February 2014
Ivory Coast YooMee Africa April 2014
Madagascar Blueline April 2014
Angola Net One August 2014
Ghana Blu Telecoms October 2014
Uganda Vodafone February 2015
Gambia Netpage March 2015
17  The candidates were Mauritius Telecom and Telecom Malagasy (Telma) of Madagascar.
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Nigeria MTN Hynet July 2015
Nigeria Cyberspace August 2015
Tanzania Smart August 2015
Cameroon MTN December 2015
Tanzania TTCL December 2015
Ghana Busy January 2016
Nigeria Bitflux August 2016
Source: GSA (n.d.), GTI (n.d.), Telegeography (n.d.)
Given the heavy Chinese involvement in infrastructure projects, it is unsurprising 
that many have added fibre optic cables to other networks (see Table 3). These con-
tribute to national and regional backbone networks and are often interconnected 
with undersea cables, an activity where Chinese firms are not yet active. Chinese 
manufacturers have also been involved in selling digital broadcast equipment to sup-
port the digital switchover ( Jiang, Li, Rønning & Tjønneland, 2016).
Table 3: Chinese support for backhaul networks
Countries Network Comments Links to 
undersea 
cables
Angola ADONES (Angola Domestic 
Network System) 
Ericsson constructed undersea coastal 
cable 1,600 km, with 8 landing sta-
tions, operational since 2008. Angola 
Cables and Alcatel Shanghai Bell 
and ZTE building land-based fibre 
network.
ACE, SAT-3, 
WACS
Cameroon-
Chad 
Oil pipeline by China National 
Petroleum Company
Includes 12 optic fibres for Central 
African Backbone (CAB)
ACE, SAT-3, 
WACS
Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo [DRC]
National fibre optic transmission 
network 
USD36m from China Exim Bank in 
2008 for CITIC to connect Kinshasa 
to and Moanda (undersea cable 
landing station) and USD223m from 
China Exim Bank for 3,250 km of 
fibre optic network by CITCC
SAT-3, 
WACS
Ethiopia Upgrade to ETC/EthioTelecom 
network
Includes 10,000 km backbone net-
work supplied by ZTE and CITCC
TEAMS, 
EaSSY, 
SEACOM, 
SEA-ME-
WE-3 via 
Djibouti
Ghana 
 
Sinopec Fibre optic cables laid alongside 
pipeline from Atuabo to Accra
ACE, SAT-3, 
WACS
Ivory Coast National fibre optic transmission 
network
USD210m for 6,700 km network by 
CITCC
ACE, SAT-3, 
WACS
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Kenya National Optic Fiber Backbone 
Infrastructure (NOFBI)
KES6,040m loan from China Exim 
Bank, supplied by Huawei
TEAMS, 
EaSSY, SEA-
COM
Lesotho National fibre backbone USD20m loan from China -
Kenya, Uganda, 
Burundi and 
South Sudan
East Africa Railway by China 
Road and Bridge Corporation 
(CRBC)
Optic fibre laid beside track TEAMS, 
EaSSY, SEA-
COM
Malawi Electricity Supply Corp. (ES-
COM)
National fibre optic network, 
connecting with Mozambique and 
Zambia
-
Namibia Nampower Fibres installed, but not yet in use -
Niger-Mali-
Algeria
Links Bamako with Algeria and 
Niger
Exim Bank USD45m for 942 km 
fibre optic network 
Several in 
Mediterra-
nean 
Tanzania National Information and Com-
munication Technology Broad-
band Backbone (NICTBB)
China Exim Bank loan USD170m, 
for construction by CITCC 
EaSSy and 
SEACOM
Uganda e-government backbone ZTE supported by USD 160M 
Chinese government loan
-
Zambia ZESCO Fibre optic network alongside elec-
tricity distribution network
-
Zambia-
Tanzania 
Tazara Railway Fibre optic network alongside railway 
network
EaSSy and 
SEACOM
Zimbabwe Link to EaSSY landing station Exim Bank EaSSY
Source: AllAfrica.com (n.d.); Aid Data (n.d.); oAfrica.com (2013)
The pattern of Chinese involvement in African telecommunications is complex and 
sometimes opaque. Where there are commercial operators, whether large or small, 
its manufacturers supply equipment at competitive prices, even in countries where 
there is a conflict or its aftermath, with the risks partially offset by the home gov-
ernment. Where there is only a state-owned monopoly, Chinese vendors will build 
a network and, if required, manage it as an outsourcer, helping to implement generic 
commercial practices to boost customer numbers and revenues. Handsets are sold to 
operators, with and without brands, and to consumers through a range of channels, 
including branded, unbranded and counterfeit. Fibres are added to other network 
infrastructure, being used for national and regional backhaul. The approaches tak-
en have been extremely flexible, seemingly unconstrained by the absence of good 
governance, enabling the growth of mobile telephony where it was least expected. 
Non-Chinese rival manufacturers rely on governments to be persuaded to open their 
markets and for operators to take advantage of the resulting licensing, after which 
they can sell equipment, giving them less scope than Chinese vendors, with their 
home country specific advantage of greater flexibility.
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6. Conclusion
In China the fused CPC/state remains a strong, if not always controlling, influence 
on telecommunication markets, owning the three principal operators, supporting 
manufacturers of network equipment, if not the handset manufacturers, and pro-
moting indigenous standards, aided by officials moving between or straddling Party, 
state and SOEs. Manufacturers have followed the CPC/state invocation to “go out”, 
scoring considerable successes, not least in Africa where it is helping to close its voice 
and data divides. At home operators and service providers have supported a strict 
system of domestic censorship, some of which has been made available for export. 
The CPC/state has delivered considerable successes in domestic services and “na-
tional champion” manufacturers, which helps maintain its legitimacy, using a policy 
model that is novel and which diverges significantly from global best practice.
African countries have never had any telecoms manufacturing capacity, have little 
or no research and development, and most governments, following the advice of the 
international financial institutions, privatised their state-owned operators, which in 
any event lacked economies of scale and the financial and commercial expertise to 
deploy new services.18 Nonetheless, governments control policy and its implemen-
tation, even if it is largely copied from elsewhere, allowing operators to negotiate 
with presidents and ministers, often excluding consumers. The adoption of the GSM 
platform, complete with legislation, policies, business models and technologies, en-
abled only limited competition, primarily due to spectrum restrictions, but allowed 
incremental investments in networks with short payback periods, facilitating entry 
even in difficult circumstances (e.g., close to war zones). It also allowed a pre-paid 
service that was to permit mobile communications access to hundreds of millions 
of customers, who could control their spending. Adaptation occurred less in poli-
cy and legislation, than in implementation and use, influenced by lobbying, bribery, 
nepotism and state capture, with significant principal-agent and information asym-
metry problems. Even flawed liberalisation allowed the entry of operators and the 
expansion of transnational groups, mostly from outside Africa, pursuing economies 
of scale and customer numbers. This enabled the widespread adoption of mobile ser-
vices without drawing on the limited supply of government funding, while boosting 
economic growth and generating significant tax revenues.19 These are not regulatory 
states, since the mechanisms for accountability are weak or absent, with governments 
finding their legitimacy in other ways, and markets operating with limited oversight.
China, having successfully transferred GSM technology from Europe, was able 
to match or undercut other manufacturers in price and quality to supply network 
18  The exceptions are only partial privatisations in Kenya and South Africa, plus North African 
countries, which retained some degree of ownership.
19  The operators complain bitterly about the “high” level of tax (Deloitte, 2014), though it is passed 
immediately to consumers.
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equipment and handsets in Africa. While it has developed its own 3G and 4G tech-
nologies, sales of these in Africa have been limited, with multinational operator 
groups preferring other standards. Backed by the CPC/state and development banks, 
Chinese manufacturers have sold equipment not only to operators in states with 
good governance and relatively competitive markets, but also to those in micro-states 
and in states in varying degrees of civil strife and conflict, where there is limited hope 
of good (sometimes any) governance. The Chinese government offset part of the 
risk for manufacturers, through its development banks. Unless governments wilfully 
resisted, Chinese firms have found ways to boost the adoption of mobile telephony 
in order to sell equipment.
Technology transfer to Africa has been limited to a few training centres for opera-
tors. Unlike China, it lacked the skilled workforce needed for factories and, especially, 
for research and development. Consequently, the spill over effects have been limited, 
though they are growing with the rise of innovation systems around mobile apps.
Outsourcing has emerged as a policy alternative to liberalisation, privatisation and 
regulation, allowing the retention of at least the façade of state provision, though it 
is probably closer to a concession. This challenges global best practice in telecom-
munications policy as advocated by the IFIs, by not seeking to create well-regu-
lated commercial markets and by disregarding good governance, instead pursuing 
latent demand by whatever means are available. Thus, remarkably, China offers two 
alternatives to global best practice: (i) commercial, engineering and management 
outsourcing; and (ii) competing state-owned operators. This points to the inflexi-
bility of the IMF and World Bank, raising questions about their failure to explore 
alternatives, and which of the three options will perform best in the longer term, as 
technologies and markets evolve. Absent from these options is a genuinely radical or 
socialist alternative.
Further research is needed to explain the reluctance of Chinese network operators 
and content providers to enter African markets, as is an exploration of the physical 
distribution system for mobile phones from China. There are also questions about 
cultural differences between Chinese and African firms, managers and employees in 
the sector. It is essential to map and to analyse ICT ecosystems in Africa and the 
role of Africa in global production networks. The investments by manufacturers and 
operators need to be examined to determine the extent of foreign direct investments 
and to understand the flows of money for equipment and networks over the lifetime 
of contracts and loans. The limited African ownership in the multinational operators 
groups needs to be explored and explained. There is a pressing need to explore the 
Chinese contribution to the security services, their provision of systems for the in-
terception of traffic and collection of metadata, of censorship, and of any spying they
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might perform on African firms and governments for China.20 The supply of mili-
tary telecommunications systems would also be interesting, if sufficient data could 
be collected.
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